THE SOVIET CONCEPT OF WAR
To the Soviets, war is a manifestation of the class struggle. It is an expression of the conflict between the "progressive forces of socialism" and the "reactionary forces of imperialistic capitalism," which they feel will be ultimately resolved in favor of socialism. The Soviet concept of war represents a continuation of politics. In Western perceptions, war occurs when politics fail to resolve conflicts nonviolently. The Soviets feel that war is the least desirable method by which the forces of history will move toward complete victory for The Soviet political and military theorists compare the socialist and capitalist camps by a concept called the "correlation of forces." This concept compares the relative political, moral, economic, and military strengths of both sides. In the Soviet view, the correlation of forces has been shifting in favor of the socialist camp since the Soviet defeat of Nazi Germany in World
War II. Soviet Marxist-Leninist ideology requires the correlation to shift continuously in favor of socialism. The correlation of forces may be advanced by both violent and nonviolent means. When it is advanced by violent means, the military component of the correlation is the dominant factor.
THE STRUCTURE OF SOVIET MILITARY THOUGHT
Soviet military doctrine is the officially accepted set of concepts that delineate the ways and means to
achieve military objectives in the interest of politics. This doctrine also specifies the structure of the Soviet armed forces, allocates industrial resources and output, and orients research and development efforts to support armed forces. Military doctrine is the blueprint drawn up by the highest Soviet political leaders that describes in specific detail the shape of the armed forces and the way they are to be used.
The formulation of Soviet military doctrine is a continuous evolutionary process based on:
• Communist ideology.
• Soviet foreign policy.
• Economic and military strengths of adversaries.
• Soviet resources and geography.
• History.
• Science and technology.
Soviet military doctrine is based on an elaborate, integrated system of thought. The doctrinal concepts
are precisely defined, and each has its place in a hierarchy of importance that corresponds to its military decision-making level. The system deals with all military issues, ranging from national defense policy down to platoon tactics. Soviet military officers are quite familiar with the entire system of thought and routinely express themselves in these terms. They think and formulate decisions using these concepts. Military science is the study and analysis of the diverse psychological and material phenomena relevant to armed combat for developing practical recommendations for the achievement of victory in war. Unlike doctrine, military science is characterized by controversy and debate. In military science, there may be several points of view, diverse "scientific" concepts, and original hypotheses that are not selected as doctrine and therefore are not accepted as official state views on military issues.
Military science encompasses
virtually all things military. Military art is the most important and primary field
within military science and is the basis for strategy, operational art, and tactics. It is the theory and practice of conducting armed conflict. The principles ofmilitary art are the basic ideas and the most important recommendations for the organization and conduct of battles, operations, and warfare.
The concept of military art and its role in military science are not just empty exercises in the Marxist-Leninist theory. Many Soviet military officers hold advanced degrees in military science and are serious
and intense in their study. They are convinced of the superiority of this methodology for preparing the
Soviet armed forces to achieve success in modem warfare. The structure of ideas, terminology, and concepts associated with this system of thought constitutes the very vocabulary through which Soviet officers express their perceptions of military problems and the measures they develop to resolve them.
Military art applies to three separate but interdependent levels of combat activity:
• Strategic - national and theater level.
• Operational -fronts and armies.
• Tactical - division and below.
Soviet perspectives on and prescriptions for armed conflict require that tactical success leads to operational success. Similarly, operational gains lead to strategic success.'
It is often difficult to separate Soviet tactics from what the Soviets call "operational art" because the
maneuver divisions that are the subject of tactics are the maneuver elements that achieve the" operational" objectives of armies and fronts. Moreover, the two concepts are closely interrelated in Soviet military thinking and planning. A recurring theme in Soviet military writing is the need for the commander to keep the "operational" goal in mind. The overriding objective of the combined arms offensive is to rapidly turn tactical success into operational success by a well orchestrated combination of massive fire, maneuver, and deep, violent strikes. It is important to understand what the Soviets mean by "tactics" and "operations" as well as the various words and verbal formulas that they associate with each concept.
To the Soviet officer, the word "operation" informs him that the activity in question
involves at least an army or a front that was probably tailored for the mission. "Tactics" consist of combat actions at division level and lower. Divisions have a set organizational structure that, except for combat support reinforcements, does not vary from mission to mission Divisions fight battles, whereas armies conduct operations. First echelon divisions usually pursue tactical objectives in the enemy's tactical depth, whereas armies-normally using their second echelon divisions-must achieve operational objectives in the enemy's operational depth.
For more, on this, Reference FM100-2-1
(http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm100-2-1.pdf)
Home 
